Introduction
The Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) by Plumber is the most prominent one for any host in a network to communicate with other hosts [1] . All hosts maintain ARP cache in the network holding the IP-MAC pair of the other hosts. So whenever a host wants to communicate with other hosts, it hunts the data from ARP cache. ARP helps the host to retrieve the MAC address for a given IP address. Though the protocol is the most prominent, it is not secured. It is prone to more number of vulnerabilities because of its stateless nature. There are two types of ARP cache entries which co-exist viz., Static and Dynamic [2, 3] . The static entry of ARP table is secure compared to dynamic entries, but it incurs colossal maintenance cost. Statically entered entries are not removed from the ARP table till the next boot but still depend on the operating system. Dynamic entries are cleared as per the network setup. As most of the evolving applications are distributed and dynamic, they prefer dynamic entries for their network.
A noteworthy feature of ARP is that it is authentication free protocol which replies to any ARP requests without validating the packets received. This is the most protuberant reason for most of the attacks on the network through ARP. ARP cache poisoning is when an attacker or an impersonator (a malevolent host) sends spoofed or forged ARP request-reply messages to the victim in the network. This act makes a fake entry in the ARP table and poisons the table. This is also called ARP spoofing.
Some of the attacks are Sniffing, ARP Spoofing, Man-in-the-Middle attack, cloning, host impersonation, connection hijack, DoS and its variants [4] . These DoS attacks and their variants have tremendous effects on cloud [5] and different solutions coexist for combatting these attacks [6, 7] on large data centres. This paper provides a framework for mitigating this Cache poisoning through an efficient mechanism. The ARP Request and reply scenario are depicted in Figs 1 and 2 , respectively. Table 1 provides details about various mitigation techniques available in the literature. The various mitigation techniques mentioned in Table 1 include centralised server based, cryptographic, non-cryptographic techniques, IDS, extensions to ARP protocol and resolved solutions by improvising the static as well as dynamic entries made. However, ARP remains unsecured. The proposed work mentioned in section III deals with non-cryptographic, timestamp and counter based approach for ARP cache poisoning. Type of network and ARP entry A centralised server mechanism which purely depends on the CS polling score elected and remains other hosts and ICMP messages [18] Detects and prevents ARP poisoning attack LAN, Static A Secondary cache mechanism using ICMP messages. The secondary cache mentioned is a text file thus alleviating the cost [19] Solves IP Exhaustion Problem LAN, Static 3. Timestamp and counter based approach for ARP cache poisoning
The proposed system TimeStamp and Counter Based Approach (TSCBA) for ARP cache poisoning attack is depicted in Fig. 3 . The input to the system is ARP Request or ARP Reply packets received by any host. The expected outcomes are abnormal packet list tables, Timestamped ARP request / Reply packets. Packet Analyzer/Decoder performs the pre-processing activities required to retrieve the contents of Ethernet Header and ARP header. Packet Analyser will filter the ARP Packets for making it available for cross-layer checking. The ARP packets such as ARP Request, ARP Reply, Unicast Alert message and Broadcast Alert message will be filtered.
Cross-Layer checker
Cross-Layer checker specified in Fig. 4 inspects whether the Ethernet header MAC address and ARP header MAC address are consistent with each other. If a match is found, then it is sent for the next level of checking. Otherwise, the packet is added to abnormal packets list. The cross-layer checker may also ensure whether the type of addressing for ARP and Ethernet pair are same or different, because this may lead to an anomaly. Table,  IP-MAC pair found, but timestamp is incorrect,  In ARP Reply packet received by any host if Source IP is Multicast or Broadcast and the cross-layer consistency is not met, i.e., there is an unexpected IP -MAC address in the packets.
 If IP-MAC pair is in Abnormal packet list table. This component generates a timestamp and appends it to ARP Request, Reply messages and unicast/Broadcast Alert messages. The timestamp field has two parts viz., the time TSg at which the ARP has replied, Request and broadcast Alert messages are generated and the time TSt, is the time till which these messages are valid. The threshold for this timestamp depends on network latency and delay. A Sample timestamp is depicted in Fig. 6 . The Alert message generator depicted in Fig. 7 generates a broadcast alert message and updates the abnormal packet list table when an abnormal packet is detected. The sample broadcast and unicast alert messages are depicted in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 , respectively. The system clears the ARP cache at every 20 minutes (can be changed based on the frequency at which a new node joins the network). As suggested by [7] , the six fundamental requirements which should be satisfied by any ARP mitigation system in LAN networks have been met by this system and they are:
1. Cross-layer inspection is carried out by the second component. 2. ARP spoof detection is performed by components 2, 3 and 4, which make the ARP stateful.
3. Unexpected IP-MAC detection by component 3. 4. Building manual and dynamic ARP table. 5. The 4th component can avoid ARP storm. ARP scanning can be done using tools, which are not covered by this system. The algorithm for the proposed system is given below.
Algorithm 1. ARP mitigation technique

Assumptions:
i. A network with n nodes.
ii. ARP cache is cleared at every 20 minutes.
iii. TSt = TSg + 10 s ( it may vary based on n and network latency). The proposed system has 2 data tables namely: Traditional ARP cache with an added entry viz., timestamp update TSup which is the system time and Abnormal Packet list table. The nomenclature of TSCBA is given in Table 2 . The contents of these two tables are specified in Table 3 and Table 4 . A new entry has been added, which may help to determine the lifetime of the host in the network and it as well helps in the setup of the cache clearing time. The timestamp field helps to avoid the DoS attacks, avoids redundancy of data from handler trying to attack the network. A new field Timestamp is added to the ARP Request and Reply messages.
This TSCBA is efficiently combatting and preventing MiTM, DoS and host impersonation attack but will incur maintenance cost and construction cost. As per the requirement stated by A l-H e m a i r y, A m i n and T r a b e l s i [10] , ARP storm detection is performed, but ARP scanning is not addressed.
TSCBA's ARP Request Processing The TSCBA's request processing algorithm generates an ARP request packet with a timestamp whenever the communicating host does not know the destination host's MAC address. This algorithm processes the ARP request by performing the cross-layer consistency check, opcode check, and abnormal packet detection by timestamp validation/expiration, unsolicited target addresses in ARP request received. When the packet fails to satisfy the above checks, it is appended in the abnormal packet list table to avoid host from being affected by the same attacker. The abnormal packet list table maintains a counter indicating the number of times an entry is made by the same IP-MAC pair.
TSCBA's ARP Reply Processing
The TSCBA's reply processing algorithm generates an ARP reply whenever the opcode of the received packet is requested, IP-MAC details of the received packet is valid, cross layer consistency check, IP-MAC entry is found in the ARP cache and Timestamp has not expired. If unsolicited MAC is received in the request or cross layer consistency is not ensured, then these details are added to abnormal list table and counts are maintained for each entry. If timestamp has expired, a unicast alert message is generated to alert the source host about the expiration.
TSCBA's Unicast Alert Message Processing
The TSCBA's unicast alert message processing algorithm generates unicast alert message whenever an expired timestamp is received in a packet. It processes the packet with opcode 4, ensures consistency with cross layer check and timestamp checks. If any of these fails it generates unicast and broadcast alert messages accordingly.
TSCBA's Broadcast Alert Message Processing
The TSCBA's broadcast alert message processing algorithm generates broadcast Alert message with an opcode 3, whenever an abnorml packet is detected at a host. It processes the message by performing opcode test, consistency test and timestamp expiration. If any of these tests outperforms, then generates the respective alert messages
Performance of proposed system
The proposed ARP framework is different from the traditional ARP by its features stated in Table 5 . The TSCBA achieves the cross-layer checking by comparing the headers viz., ARP and Ethernet headers ensuring the MAC address are the same as intended. This incurs in the sequence of steps say O (1) . It also scans the ARP cache to find the existence of the IP-MAC pair which is a sequential search incurring O(K) steps where K is the size of the ARP cache which varies as per the cache clearance. 
Authenticated and Stateful
Unlike traditional ARP, this will not process any replies without a request being sent, and it will not update the ARP cache as soon as the ARP reply is received, but there is no mechanism imposed for keeping track of the request-reply pair It makes use of timestamps and cross-layer checker to make cache updates
Avoids Broadcast storms
Since the alert messages are sent with a timestamp, the floods with the broadcast alert message will never be generated Timestamps are generated by the current date and time of the system clock using the inbuilt function DateTime() which incurs in O(n) where n is the number of parameters required to compute the timestamp. Consider a packet with details of A in the source with invalid IP, i.e., 192.168.1.16 and valid MAC is sent to C. At C, it matches the cross-layer check, but IP-MAC pair will not be validated since A's IP is forged. The contents of the Abnormal list table of C and B is shown in Fig. 11 . In the above case the packet details are not updated in ARP cache as in traditional ARP, instead added to abnormal packet lists. In turn, C will alert A with a unicast alert message to A, to confirm that it has been forged.
Consider A has received a reply from C with IP:192.168.1.12 and MAC Address: 00:5:79:66:68:34 which is not C's MAC. The ARP Reply is dropped, and Abnormal List table of A is updated with these details, and other hosts were intimated about this. The contents of the table are specified in Fig. 12 .
The abnormal list table will be updated as above whenever the following types of packets are being received:
Pkt1 IPFInvalid IP address this includes all other types of IP addresses other than the one assigned to the hosts.
MACFInvalid MAC addresses, the MACs which are not matched with crosslayer check, and this include NULL MAC, Multicast, and Broadcast MAC addresses.
IPVCorrect IP address of the sender/receiver is specified in the packet MACVCorrect MAC address of the host is specified in the packet The packets of types specified in Pkt3, Pkt4, Pkt7, Pkt8, Pkt11 and Pk12 will help to combat DDoS, MiTM and host impersonation attacks whereas other packets may also avoid these attacks based explicitly on IP spoofing. Though the algorithmic checks are performed to avoid the attacks based on ARP, these are performed after ARP scanning. Some of the checks like NULL MAC addresses, unused MAC addresses, Multicast addresses can be detected before cross-layer inspection which may reduce the cost. Based on the different types of packets captured by the proposed algorithm, the attack prevention ratio is calculated as (1) Attack_Prevention_Rate (%) ∶= #Attack type packets captured #Attack type packets injected .
The attack type packets are computed as follows: (2) #Attack type packets captured = ∑ count( ), 16 =1 where P i is the packet type Pkti. The type of attacks considered for analysis includes MiTM, DDoS, cloning attack, MAC spoofing, IP spoofing and Bombing packet attack (malicious entry in ARP cache). The APR (Attack Prevention Rate) based on the attack type is depicted in Fig. 13 and the attack type packets captured by TSCBA is described in Table 6 . The detection of abnormal packet types by various mitigation techniques is described in Table 7 . For this scenario, the packets of type Pkt9 to Pkt13 is not considered since it is newly introduced in the proposed system.
Prevention against MiTM attacks
In Fig. 14 , if the host C who knows the IP and MAC address of host A and host B, can be compromised and become malicious when it tries to exploit the communication between A and B with its spoofed MAC as follows:
 Host C captures the request sent by host A to host B and responds host A with ARP reply (IP-B, MAC-C, TSg, TSt). However, host A will not accept this because the host C will be caught in the cross-layer check.
 Host C captures the request sent by host A to host B and modifies it as ARP request (IP-A, MAC-C, TSg, TSt). However, again it will be caught at host B by cross-layer inspection. In this way, it avoids host impersonation or ARP cloning attack 
Prevention against DoS and DDoS attacks
When the malicious host C, with the aim of exploiting the victim B does the following:  It can send numerous ARP requests between the same time interval TSg and TSt; host B checks the abnormal packet list and if the entry is found, it updates the count and alerts all other hosts else on receiving two or more requests simultaneously, host B will add it to B's abnormal packet list. However, this will be successful only 50% as the host B will not always inspect the ARP requests.
 In case of DDoS attacks, more than one host will send abnormal requests, unlike DoS. If requests are sent to spoof MAC, there is 100% chance for preventing the attack. 
Ndoes not detect GARP does not detect reply based malicious packets because the system uses broadcast reply.
Comparison of the proposed system with the existing technique
The proposed system is compared to the existing system based on six security requirements specified in [7] . It is described in Table 8 . It is clear that the proposed system does not perform ARP scan. GARP works well, but one disadvantage is that it uses more tables and certifiers which incur additional overhead. The comparison graph is generated by analysing the packet types to ARP, Centralized Approach, GARP, SARP and Proposed Approach. The traditional ARP can detect any packet only if the static entry is maintained, whereas in dynamic nature it can detect only when the entry exists in ARP cache. The packets of the type with NULL MAC and Multicast MAC were also analysed. In such cases, the proposed system can detect by using a cross-layer check, but it can be properly checked before scanning the tables. The Abnormal Packet Prevention Rate (APPR) is calculated as specified in (3) . From the graph, it is clear that the traditional ARP is most vulnerable to all these types of malicious packets, whereas the proposed technique shows a better detection rate. Table 9 shows the detection rate of TSCBA against existing techniques. The new mitigation techniques for ARP cache poisoning attacks have been analysed, and types of mitigation has been presented. Though these techniques combat the attacks, a novel mitigation system with modifications to traditional ARP messages for the purpose of enhancing their features has been proposed. Also, this new system uses two more messages and data tables to improve its efficiency. A detailed algorithm for the proposed system is developed. Though this technique may be a little costlier than traditional ARP, this system can combat ARP cache poisoning attacks and will prove its cost-effectiveness. The future study is to detect the ARP Scanning by incorporating with any tools available.
